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Across two studies participants completed a learning phase comprised of two types of 
trials: context pairing trials in which two (valenced or non-valenced) words were identical or 
opposite to one another and evaluative conditioning (EC) trials in which a CS was paired 
with a US. Based on the idea that EC occurs because CS-US pairings function as a symbolic 
cue about the relation between the CS and the US, we hypothesized that the nature of context 
pairings (identical or opposite) might moderate EC effects. Results indicate that identity-
based context pairs led to typical assimilative explicit and implicit effects whereas 
opposition-based pairs led to attenuated effects. Implications and different accounts of our 
findings are discussed. 












Evaluative Conditioning is Modulated by the Nature of Contextual Pairings 
Evaluation is at the core of human psychology. It not only guides our judgments and 
decisions but often dictates how we treat our friends and family, as well as novel individuals, 
social, religious, and ethnic groups. Evaluations are assumed to bias what we remember, 
influence the politicians we vote for, musicians we listen to, and the products we consume. It 
is therefore crucial that we understand how, when, and why evaluations are established and 
what factors play a role in their change. 
Many researchers have focused on Evaluative Conditioning (EC) - a change in liking 
due to the pairing of stimuli - as a means of establishing and manipulating evaluations. In a 
typical EC study a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) acquires the valence of a positive or 
negative unconditioned stimulus (US) with which it was previously paired. For example, 
contiguous presentations of an unknown brand product with pleasant images can result in that 
product being evaluated positively whereas pairing it with negative images results in it being 
evaluated negatively (see Hofmann, De Houwer, & Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010).  
Although EC has traditionally been viewed as a rather “primitive” or simple form of 
learning (e.g., Briñol, Petty, and McCaslin, 2009) we recently introduced a new ‘symbolic’ 
perspective on this phenomenon (De Houwer & Hughes, 2016). This perspective argues that, 
early on in their development, humans gain access to a symbolic learning pathway, one that 
enables them to relate stimuli in a diverse number of ways. Once this ability is acquired, they 
can come to treat virtually any proximal event in the environment as a symbol (or cue) which 
can - in turn - influence their behavior. These cues can take many forms: from words and 
sentences, to musical or mathematical notation, physical objects (e.g., a red traffic light), or 
even gestures such as a wink of the eye or nod of the head. Put another way, stimuli in the 




environment can function as symbols on the basis of which symbolic meaning is 
constructed.1  
If humans are capable of imbuing stimuli with symbolic meaning (e.g., acting-as-if 
the word ‘snake’ stands for an actual snake), then it seems reasonable to assume that they can 
also imbue environmental regularities with such meaning as well. An environmental 
regularity refers to “all states in the environment of the organism that entail more than the 
presence of a single stimulus or behavior at a single moment in time.” (De Houwer, Barnes-
Holmes, & Moors, 2013, p. 634). For instance, the environment can be arranged to create 
regularities such as the repeated presentation of a single stimulus (e.g., mere exposure) or 
relationships between stimuli and actions (e.g., approach-avoidance training). We propose 
that stimulus pairings - the regularity at the core of EC - represents yet another that can 
convey symbolic meaning. Our hypothesis is that the pairing of stimuli changes liking 
because humans respond to those pairings as a contextual cue symbolizing that the CS and 
US are related in a certain manner. From this perspective, EC research provides unique 
information about the way that symbolic meaning construction on the basis of stimulus 
pairings gives rise to changes in liking (De Houwer & Hughes, 2016).  
EC as a Symbolic Phenomenon 
Conceptualising EC as a symbolic phenomenon has both heuristic value (it can 
accommodate a number of recent findings in the literature) and predictive value (it leads to 
several new empirical possibilities). First, if pairings do function as a contextual cue 
signalling how the CS and US should be related, and people have a learning history of doing 
                                                 
1 Note that our definition of a ‘symbol’ and ‘symbolic meaning construction’ is situated at a very abstract level 
of analysis. We view symbols as stimuli which are in some ways functionally substitutable for other stimuli in 
the environment (i.e., something that can stand for something else) and symbolic meaning construction as the 
transformation of a proximal event into a symbol by organisms with the aforementioned ability. By operating at 
a high level of abstraction, we hope to obtain new insights and reach consensus that might not be achievable 
when operating at the level of specific theories about learning and liking. That said, there are theories at both the 
functional (e.g., Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, 2001) and mental levels (e.g., Deacon, 1997) which offer 
insight into the origins and nature of symbols and symbolic meaning construction and which seem compatible 
with the general position we forward here. 




so, then there may be some ‘default’ symbolic meaning that they attribute to stimulus 
pairings. Based on the EC literature (e.g., Hofmann et al. 2010) and findings elsewhere in 
learning psychology (e.g., Hughes, De Houwer, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016), we hypothesize 
that the ‘default’ symbolic meaning of pairings is ‘similarity’ – namely – that the CS and US 
are similar along a particular dimension (e.g., valence). Similarity relations typical lead to the 
assimilative effects seen in the EC literature wherein a CS acquires the same valence as a US. 
The key point here is that, for organisms with access to the symbolic learning pathway, 
stimulus pairings may function in much the same way as the expression “is similar to” in the 
instruction “A is similar to B” (i.e., they symbolize that two stimuli share certain properties; 
De Houwer & Hughes, 2016).  
Second, if humans do treat pairings as a symbolic cue upon which meaning is 
constructed, then it should be possible to manipulate the meaning that pairings convey. Just 
as the symbolic meaning of individual stimuli can vary across contexts (e.g., the letter-string 
‘bad’ means ‘bathtub’ in Dutch and ‘negative’ in English), it might also be that the symbolic 
meaning of stimulus pairings also varies over contexts. In other words, the symbolic meaning 
of pairings is not entirely fixed: in one context, pairings could symbolize that the CS and US 
are similar to one another and yet in another context, pairings could symbolize that the CS 
and US are opposite or that they are causally or hierarchically related to one another. This 
idea is consistent with recent EC work showing that the impact of pairings on liking can be 
modified in a variety of ways. Several researchers have introduced relational qualifiers such 
as the words ‘enemy’ or ‘loathes’ during CS-US pairings and found that this can lead to 
contrastive EC effects (i.e., the CS acquires the opposite valence of the US it was paired with; 
Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2012). Others have provided explicit 
instructions before or after the EC phase stating that paired words have a particular meaning 
(e.g., synonyms or antonyms) and found assimilative and contrastive effects, respectively 




(Hu, Gawronski, & Balas, 2017; Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014). Still others have 
asked participants to complete judgement tasks that focused their attention on the relative 
value of the CS or US and produced similar outcomes (Unkelbach & Fiedler, 2016) or primed 
a certain relation (similarity or difference) prior to the EC phase (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, 
& Mussweiler, 2009). For instance, Corneille et al. initially primed participants to focus on 
either the perceptual similarities or differences between stimuli and then administered a 
(purportedly unrelated) learning phase in which CSs were paired with USs. They found that 
participants who were primed with the goal of processing perceptual similarities between 
stimuli showed larger EC effects than those primed with the goal of processing their 
perceptual differences. Finally, a combination of instructions about, and then exposure to, 
paired events can lead to contrastive EC effects as well (e.g., Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013; 
Peters & Gawronski, 2011).  
For the main part, the aforementioned work interpreted these contrastive EC effects as 
being due to the impact of a symbolic message that is delivered on top of pairings and often 
assumed that implicit evaluations would only be influenced by pairings whereas the symbolic 
message would exert an exclusive influence on explicit evaluations. Hence, the symbolic 
message and the pairings were seen as distinct sources of changes in evaluations, with 
pairings being inherently non-symbolic in nature. We take a different perspective. Drawing 
on the symbolic account, we hypothesize that the aforementioned effects can arise because 
relational qualifiers, instructions, contrastive judgements, and priming tasks transform the 
symbolic meaning of the pairings themselves. If this is the case, and pairings do have a 
default symbolic meaning, then it should be possible change this meaning in multiple ways, 
not only by providing verbal information about the pairings but also by adding contextual 




pairings2. More specifically, presenting pairs of stimuli that are opposite to one another could 
signal that, within that broader context, pairings is a cue indicating that stimuli are opposite to 
one another (along some dimension). Hence, if a neutral CS is paired with a valenced US in 
that same context then this could result in an attenuated or even reversed EC effect. Likewise, 
presenting contextual pairs of identical stimuli might strengthen the default symbolic 
meaning of pairings and thus lead to stronger EC effects. In short, a symbolic 
conceptualisation of EC leads to the novel prediction that EC depends on the relational 
properties of stimulus pairs that occur within the same context as the CS-US pairs. One way 
to test this hypothesis is to examine if contextual pairings moderate EC effects.3 
The Current Research 
Towards this end, we set out to moderate the direction and magnitude of EC effects 
by means of context pairings. During a learning phase participants were exposed to two 
different types of trials: EC trials in which a neutral nonsense word (CS) was paired with 
valenced words (US) and context trials in which two words were presented that were either 
identical (e.g., day-day, up-up, cold-cold) or opposite in their meaning (e.g., day-night, up-
down, cold-hot). We assessed liking via self-report ratings and an Implicit Association Test 
(IAT). We added an IAT as it is assumed to reflect more automatic instances of evaluation 
that can influence behavior in unique ways (e.g., De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & 
                                                 
2 The priming manipulation of Corneille et al. (2009) could been seen as another way of altering the symbolic 
meaning of pairings via contextual manipulations (i.e., they directed attention towards the similarities or 
differences between one set of paired events [pictures] and then introduced a second set of such events [CS-US 
pairings]). Although the priming manipulation could have exerted an impact because of this reason, it is 
important to note that this manipulation was designed explicitly with the aim of changing the perceptual 
processing of stimuli. Hence, the effects of the priming manipulation could also have merely influenced 
perceptual processes.  
3 At the mental level of analysis our symbolic view is distinct from, but certainly compatible with, propositional 
models of EC. Given that our symbolic view considers pairings as cues which specify how stimuli are related, 
and that propositional representations are necessary in order to encode [higher-order] relational information in a 
mental system, it seems likely that propositions are a necessary component for symbolic meaning construction 
to occur. Critically, however, our symbolic view extends beyond propositional models by highlighting that 
pairings themselves can function as symbols (not just the CSs and US which are paired) and that pairings can 
also influence the relational content of the propositional belief. 




Moors, 2009). If EC effects can be moderated by changes in context, then we would expect to 
observe larger EC effects when context trials involve identical compared to opposite stimuli.  
Finally, past work on oppositional relational qualifiers and instructions has tended to 
reveal attenuated rather than fully reversed EC effects. This outcome has driven theorising in 
the area and led to a number of competing accounts (see Moran, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2016a). 
The symbolic perspective outlined above speaks to this issue as well. As we outline in the 
General Discussion, there are two versions of the symbolic account (one strong and one 
weak) that differ in the type and number of assumptions that they make. The weak symbolic 
perspective argues that - under certain conditions - pairings can function as a symbol and thus 
influence the magnitude and evaluative direction of EC effects. Yet in other cases pairings 
function as a mere proximal cause of the change in liking (i.e., the impact of the pairings on 
liking merely depends on their spatio-temporal [and not their symbolic] properties). In 
contrast, the strong symbolic perspective argues that pairings always function as a symbol: 
once an individual has acquired the ability to respond symbolically, stimuli in the 
environment are always imbued with such meaning (i.e., they never function as mere 
proximal causes). Therefore, according to the weak symbolic perspective, attenuation effects 
emerge when pairings function as a symbolic cue for some people and as a mere proximal 
cause for others. From the weak symbolic perspective, it is also possible that pairings 
function as a symbolic cue for everyone but that the meaning of that cue either differ within-
subjects (the same person can simultaneously treat some pairings as a cue for similarity and 
other pairings as a cue for opposition) or between-subjects (one person can treat it as a cue for 
similarity whereas others can treat it as a cue for opposition). From a strong symbolic 
perspective, attenuation effects emerge when pairings have multiple meanings for the same 
person (within-subjects explanation) or a single meaning which differs between people 
(between-subjects explanation). Both accounts would predict that fully reversed effects 




emerge when pairings function as a symbolic cue, and when the meaning of that cue is 
consistent within and between participants (i.e., pairings is a cue for opposition).4  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design. 100 participants (49 women) ranging from 18 to 49 years 
(M = 30.2, SD = 7.7) participated online via the Prolific Academic website 
(https://prolific.ac) in exchange for a monetary reward (€1.25). The experiment 
was programmed in Inquisit 4.0 and hosted via Inquisit Web (Millisecond Software, Seattle, 
WA). The experiment involved a single factor between-subjects design (Context Pair Type: 
same vs. opposite) with self-reported ratings and IAT scores as the main dependent variables. 
Three additional method variables were manipulated between participants: evaluative task 
order (self-reports vs. IAT first), IAT block order (learning [EC] phase consistent vs. 
inconsistent first), and stimulus assignment (CS1 with positive/negative USs). The sample 
size was determined prior to data collection in a convenience sampling manner. Note that the 
study designs, data-analysis plans, scripts, and data for both experiments are available on the 
Open Science Framework website (https://osf.io/bn2q3/). We report all manipulations and 
measures used in the study.  
Materials. Two nonsense words served as CSs (Ambik and Safrom). Ten positive 
(healthy, joy, freedom, friendship, honesty, beautiful, pretty, love, happiness, delightful) and 
ten negative adjectives (miscarriage, torture, cancer, disgusting, tumor, pain, rape, agony, 
hate, sickness) served as USs. The words up, down, night, day, rich, poor, summer, winter, 
                                                 
4 We ran two initial pilot studies (n = 41 and n = 60) that attempted to influence EC effects by manipulating the 
nature of context pairs (words vs. pictures), and context pair training (blocked vs. interspersed). Results 
indicated that implicit and explicit evaluations were consistently biased by context pairs, such that assimilative 
EC effects emerged when the context pairs signaled that pairings were a cue for sameness whereas attenuated 
effects emerged when pairings were a cue for opposition. Experimental scripts, raw data, and analyses for these 
two pilot studies can also be found on the OSF website (https://osf.io/bn2q3/). 




old, young, sick, healthy, strong, weak, fast, slow, right, left, hot, cold, black, white, dead, 
alive, before, after, even, and odd were presented during context pair trials. 
During the IAT the two CSs served as labels for the target stimuli and the words 
“Good” and “Bad” served as labels for the attribute stimuli. Eight positively valenced and 
eight negatively valenced adjectives served as attribute stimuli (fantastic, great, magnificent, 
lovely, excellent, wonderful, amazing, super versus terrible, nasty, poor, horrible, hideous, 
awful, rotten, unpleasant) and the two CSs in different fonts and orientations served as the 
target stimuli. 
Procedure 
There were three experimental phases: a learning phase, evaluative measures, and 
exploratory questions. 
Learning phase. Prior to the learning phase participants were informed that they 
would either see two words or images and that they should pay attention to these at all times. 
Overall they encountered eight blocks that each contained 10 trials (80 trials total). The task 
was comprised of two different types of blocks (i.e., four blocks containing context trials and 
four blocks containing EC trials). Context trials involved the simultaneous presentation of 
two words for 3000ms. Participants in the identical context pairs condition encountered 
identical words (e.g., Old-Old, Up-Up) whereas their counterparts in the opposite context 
pairs condition were exposed to words that were opposite in meaning (e.g., Old-Young, Up-
Down). Thereafter both stimuli disappeared, and following a 1000ms inter-trial interval (ITI), 
the next context pair was presented. EC trials involved the presentation of CS1 along with 
one of ten different positively valenced adjectives or CS2 along with one of ten negative 
adjectives for 3000ms. Both context and CS-US pairs were presented in random order within 
their respective blocks. The onscreen location of stimuli was always the same within a given 
block. That said, we (a) varied the location of the stimuli across blocks (e.g., the contextual 




stimuli or CSs and USs were either presented parallel, vertically, or diagonally adjacent to 
one another) and (b) used the same stimulus location parameter in consecutive context and 
EC blocks (i.e., if the context stimuli were presented parallel to one another then so too were 
the CSs and USs in the following block). We adopted such a design in the hope that it would 
maximize generalization from context trials to EC trials by highlighting that stimuli in both 
types of trials were presented in the same temporal and spatial manner. Finally, we presented 
the context and EC blocks in sequential order such that a context block was always followed 
by a EC block of trials. 
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported ratings were assessed using four different 
semantic differential scales. On each trial, one of the two CSs was presented and participants 
were asked to indicate their general impression of the stimulus using a scale ranging from 
10 to +10 with 0 as a neutral point. The four end-points of the scales were as follows: 
Negative-Positive, Pleasant-Unpleasant, Good-Bad, I Like It-I Don’t Like It. A mean 
evaluative rating was calculated for each CS by averaging scores from these four scales. 
IAT. Automatic evaluative responding was assessed using an IAT. Participants were 
informed that a series of words would appear one-by-one in the middle of the screen and that 
their task was to categorize those items with their respective target (CS1 or CS2) or attribute 
categories (‘Good’ and ‘Bad’) as quickly and accurately as possible. They were told that the 
two items they had previously encountered (targets) as well as the words “Good” and “Bad” 
(attributes) would appear on the upper left and right sides of the screen and that stimuli could 
be assigned to these categories using either the left (‘E’) or right keys (‘I’). Each trial started 
with the presentation of a target or attribute stimulus in the middle of the screen. If the 
participant categorized the word correctly – by selecting the appropriate key for that block of 
trials – the stimulus disappeared from the screen and the next trial began. In contrast, an 
incorrect response resulted in the presentation of a red “X” which remained on-screen until 




the correct key was pressed. Overall, each participant completed seven blocks of trials. The 
first block of 20 practice trials required them to sort CS1 and CS2 into their respective 
categories, with CS1 assigned to the left (‘E’) key and CS2 to the right (‘I’) key. On the 
second block of 20 practice trials, participants assigned positive words to the “Good” 
category using the left key and negative words to the “Bad” category using the right key. 
Blocks 3 and 4 (20 and 40 trials, respectively) involved a combined assignment of target and 
attribute stimuli to their respective categories. Specifically, participants categorized CS1 and 
positive words using the left key and CS2 and negative words using the right key. The fifth 
block of 20 trials reversed the key assignments, with CS2 now assigned to the left key and 
CS1 to the right key. Finally, the sixth and seventh blocks (20 and 40 trials respectively) 
required participants to categorize CS1 with negative words and CS2 with positive words.  
Exploratory questions. We assessed whether participants were hypothesis aware 
using the following questions: “What do you think the aim of this experiment was?” and 
“How do you think the experiment achieved this?”. We also assessed for context pair 
awareness (“During the experiment, did you notice that we sometimes presented words that 
were SIMILAR/OPPOSITE to one another together onscreen?”), and context pair influence 
(“Did this influence how you responded to CS1 and CS2”). A manipulation check was also 
included to check whether participants physically recorded the contingencies operating 
during the learning phase. We also assessed for CS-US contingency memory, how confident 
participants were in their evaluations, and asked them to complete a behavioral choice task. 
Many of these variables were registered purely for exploratory purposes and will not be 
discussed further in the paper. 
Results 
Data Preparation 




In-line with IAT data treatment elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Smith, De Houwer, & 
Nosek, 2013), data-exclusion involved removing participants who had IAT error rates above 
30% across the entire task or above 40% for any one of the four critical blocks (n = 5), or 
who responded faster than 400ms on more than 10% of trials (n = 3). This led to a final 
sample of 92 participants.5 
Analytic Strategy 
To determine whether self-reported ratings and automatic evaluative responses 
towards CS1 and CS2 (dependent variables) differed as a function of the type of context pairs 
presented (same vs. opposite) (independent variable), a series of ANOVAs and post-hoc t-
tests were carried out on the rating and IAT data. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Descriptive analyses for hypothesis and context pair awareness/influence as well as 
contingency memory can be found in Table 1.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Self-reported ratings. Mean ratings can be found in Table 2. Positive values indicate 
a preference for a CS whereas negative values indicate the opposite (the internal consistency 
of the positive and negative ratings was excellent; Cronbach's alpha = .98 and .97 
respectively). Submitting mean ratings to a 2 (Stimulus: CS paired with positive vs. negative 
USs) × 2 (Context Pairs: same vs. opposite) mixed ANOVA (with the former factor within 
and the latter manipulated between participants) revealed a main effect for Stimulus, F(1, 90) 
= 31.62, p < .001, η2partial = .26, 95% CI [0.12; 0.39], BF10 > 10
4, and a two-way interaction 
between Stimulus and Context Pair Type, F(1, 90) = 28.23, p < .001, η2partial = .24, 95% CI 
[0.10; 0.38], BF10 > 10
4, with Bayes Factors strongly supporting the hypothesis that an EC 
                                                 
5 Note that including the data for all participants in the analyses did not result in a shift in significance for any of 
the reported effects (in Experiments 1 or 2). That said, we decided to continue excluding these participants to be 
consistent with our initial data-analytic plan.  




effect emerged and that it was moderated by the type of context pairs that participants 
encountered. Participants exposed to identical context pairings showed an assimilative EC 
effect: they liked CS1 more than CS2, t(43) = 12.01, p < .001, d = 1.79, 95% CI [1.31; 2.26], 
BF10 > 10
4. Those exposed to opposite context pairings showed no preference for CS1 over 
CS2, as the test of difference did not reach significance, t(47) = 0.18, p = .86, d = 0.03, BF01 
= 6.28, with Bayes Factors providing additional evidence that EC effects attenuated rather 
than reversed as the result of opposite context pairings. 
IAT. Submitting IAT scores to a one-way ANOVA with Context Pairs as a between-
subjects factor revealed a main effect of Context Pair Type, F(1, 91) = 18.53, p < .001, η2partial 
= .17, 95% CI [0.05; 0.30], BF10 > 10
2, indicating that the presence of context pairs also 
moderated IAT effects. Participants who encountered identity context pairings showed an 
assimilative EC effect: they liked CS1 relatively more than CS2. Those exposed to opposite 
context pairings showed no preference for either stimulus. Whereas the former score was 
significantly different from zero, t(43) = 6.73, p < .001, d = 1.01, 95% CI [0.64; 1.38], BF10 > 
104, the latter was not, t(47) = 0.56, p = .58, d = .08, BF01 = 5.50, with IAT scores attenuated 
rather than reversed following opposite context pairings.  
Implicit-explicit correlations and contingency memory. The contingency memory 
task consisted of two questions: one probing for the contingency between CS1 and positive 
USs and another probing for the contingency between CS2 and negative USs. Participants 
who answered these two questions correctly were assigned a score of 1 whereas those who 
failed to do so were assigned a score of 0. We then assessed whether contingency memory 
performance was correlated with implicit and explicit evaluations (and whether the latter 
scores also correlated with one another). Self-reported ratings of CS1 were negatively 
correlated with those of CS2 (r = -.89) and positively correlated with IAT scores (r = .59) 
(CS2 evaluations were negatively correlated with IAT scores; r = -.61). Explicit evaluations 




of CS1 (r = .29), CS2 (r = -.35) and IAT scores (r = .24) were all correlated with contingency 
memory performance (all ps < .03). 
Discussion  
 Results indicate that EC effects are moderated by the presence of contextual pairings. 
Assimilative effects emerged when context trials contained identical stimuli (i.e., participants 
explicitly and implicitly preferred the CS paired with positive over the CS paired with 
negative images). Yet exposure to context trials containing paired events that were opposite 
to one another obliterated EC effects, with implicit and explicit evaluations attenuated to non-
significance.   
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 set out to replicate and extend our initial findings in two ways. First, we 
now manipulated not only the nature (same vs. opposite) but also valence of the context 
pairings. One group of participants encountered valenced context pairs (e.g., happy-sad) 
whereas another group were exposed to non-valenced pairs (e.g., right-left). On the one hand, 
valenced context pairs might be seen as more similar to the CS-US pairs (which also involved 
one valenced stimulus) that might increase the probability that the nature of the relation on 
context trials was seen as diagnostic for the symbolic meaning of the pairings on the CS-US 
trials. On the other hand, non-valenced context pairs might convey more clearly the 
oppositional nature of the context pairs, thereby increasing the power of those pairs as a way 
of changing the symbolic meaning of the CS-US pairings also. Therefore, although there are 
reasons to expect that this manipulation would influence the magnitude of the context effects 
on EC, we did not have clear a priori predictions regarding the direction of its effect. Second, 
we presented context trials and CS-US trials within the same block rather than in different 
blocks, hoping that this would highlight that both types of trials occur in the same temporal 
and spatial context and thus increase the likelihood that people generalize the relational 




meaning of the context trials to the CS-US trials. We hoped that by implementing these two 
procedural changes we could strengthen the impact of our manipulation on resulting EC 
effects, and thus move from an attenuation to a full reversal in evaluations. 
Method  
Participants and Design. Two hundred and fourteen participants (132 women) 
ranging from 18 to 53 years (M = 33.9, SD = 8.9) participated online via the Prolific 
Academic website in exchange for a monetary reward (€1.25). The experiment involved a 
two factor between-subjects design: Context Pair Type (same vs. opposite) and Context Pair 
Valence (valenced vs. non-valenced), with self-reported ratings and IAT scores as the main 
dependent variables. Evaluative task order and IAT block order were also manipulated 
between participants. The sample size was determined prior to data collection on a 
convenience sampling manner.  
Materials. The same CSs were used as in Experiment 1. Eight positive (friend, 
happy, healthy, clean, selfless, freedom, pleasure, nice) and eight negative adjectives (enemy, 
sad, sick, dirty, selfish, imprisoned, pain, nasty) served as USs. The same USs were also used 
during context pairings. The following words served as non-valenced stimuli during context 
pair trials: big, small, loud, quiet, black, white, fire, ice, heavy, light, old, young, fast, slow, 
up, down, hot, cold, left, right, day, night. 
Procedure 
There were three experimental phases: a learning phase, evaluative measures, and 
exploratory questions. 
Learning phase. Participants were first informed that they would see two words on 
the screen and that they should pay attention to what appeared at all times. The learning 
phase consisted of four blocks that each contained 10 mini-blocks (40 mini-blocks in total). 
Each mini-block was comprised of two separate trials: the presentation of a context pair 




followed by the presentation of a CS-US pair. A rectangular frame was presented onscreen at 
trial-onset. After 1000ms the first word of the context pair appeared, and 1000ms thereafter 
the second word of the context pair was presented. Both remained onscreen for a further 
2000ms before disappearing. After a 1000ms intra-trial interval a CS appeared and remained 
alone onscreen for 1000ms. Thereafter a US appeared and the two stimuli remained onscreen 
for a further 2000ms. All stimuli then disappeared, and following a 2000ms inter-trial-
interval, the next mini-block began.  
On EC trials, CS1 was presented with one of eight different positively valenced 
adjectives whereas CS2 was presented with one of eight negative adjectives. On context 
trials, participants in the identical valenced context pairs condition encountered identically 
valenced words (e.g., Happy-Happy, Sad-Sad) whereas their counterparts in the non-valenced 
identical context pairs condition encountered identical non-valenced words (e.g., Small-
Small, Left-Left). Those in the opposite valenced context pairs condition were exposed to 
valenced words that were opposite in meaning (e.g., Happy-Sad, Love-Hate) and the non-
valenced opposite context pair condition encountered non-valenced words with opposite 
meanings (e.g., Right-Left, Fast-Slow).  
Evaluative measures. Self-reported ratings and automatic evaluative responding 
(IAT) were assessed as in Experiment 1. 
Exploratory questions. A similar set of exploratory questions were administered as 
in Experiment 1. We also asked participants to complete a relational matching-to-sample 
procedure and a need for cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984). Again these variables 
were registered purely for exploratory purposes and will not be discussed further. 
Results 
Data Preparation  




Participants who failed to complete the whole experiment were excluded (N = 12). Of 
those who did complete, we omitted a further nine who had IAT error rates above 30% across 
the entire task (n = 4), above 40% for any one of the four critical blocks (n = 2), or who 
responded faster than 400ms on more than 10% of trials (n = 3). This led to a final sample of 
193 participants.  
Preliminary Analyses  
Descriptive analyses for hypothesis and context pair awareness/influence as well as 
contiguity memory can be found in Table 1.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Self-reported ratings. Mean ratings can be found in Table 3. Submitting evaluative 
scores to a 2(Stimulus) x 2 (Context Pair Valence) × 2 (Context Pair Type) mixed ANOVA 
(with the first factor manipulated within and the latter two factors between participants) 
revealed a main effect for Stimulus, F(1, 189) = 20.83, p < .001, η2partial = .10, 95% CI [0.03; 
0.18], BF10 > 10
4, with Bayes Factors offering strong support for the hypothesis that an EC 
effect emerged. We also observed a two-way interaction between Stimulus and Context Pair 
Type, F(1, 189) = 17.14, p < .001, η2partial = .09, 95% CI [0.02; 0.16], BF10 > 10, as well as a 
three-way interaction between Stimulus, Context Pair Valence, and Context Pair Type, F(1, 
189) = 12.11, p = .001, η2partial = .06, 95% CI [0.01; 0.14], BF10 > 10. To specify this three-way 
interaction we consider the impact of context pair type separately for those in the valence and 
non-valenced context pair conditions.  
Participants exposed to valenced contextual pairs showed a main effect of Stimulus, 
F(1, 85) = 7.46, p < .01, η2partial = .08, 95% CI [0.01; 0.20], BF10 > 8.3, as well as a two-way 
interaction between Stimulus and Context Pair Type, F(1, 85) = 22.91, p < .001, η2partial = .21, 
95% CI [0.08; 0.35], BF10 > 10
3. Paired-sample t-tests indicated that an assimilative EC effect 
emerged in the identical context pairings condition: participants liked CS1 more than CS2, 




t(41) = 6.17, p < .001, d = 0.95, 95% CI [0.58; 1.31], BF10 > 10
4. In absolute terms, a 
contrastive EC effect emerged in the opposite context pairings condition: participants liked 
CS2 more than CS1. Note, however, that the difference between CS2 and CS1 ratings did not 
reach significance in this latter condition, t(44) = 1.32, p = .20, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.10; 
0.49], BF01 = 2.77, thus indicating that EC effects were attenuated rather than completely 
reversed following opposite context pairs. Although participants exposed to non-valenced 
context pairings also showed a main effect of Stimulus, F(1, 104) = 14.49, p < .001, η2partial = 
.12, 95% CI [0.03; 0.24], BF10 > 10
3, they did not show any main or interaction effects for 
Context Pair Type (ps > .32), such that CS1 was always liked more than CS2 regardless of 
the type of context pairs encountered.  
IAT. Submitting IAT scores to a 2 (Context Pair Type) × 2 (Context Pair Valence) 
ANOVA revealed a main effect for Context Pair Valence, F(1, 191) = 6.06, p = .02, η2partial = 
.03, 95% CI [0.01; 0.09], BF10 = 2.37, and Context Pair Type, F(1, 191) = 14.66, p < .001, 
η2partial = .07, 95% CI [0.02; 0.15], BF10 > 10, but no interaction between the two, F(1, 191) = 
3.99, p = .07, η2partial = .02, 95% CI [0.00; 0.08], BF10 = 1.08. Participants showed an IAT 
effect favoring CS1 over CS2 in the non-valenced condition, indicated by an IAT effect that 
was significantly different from zero, t(104) = 2.35, p = .02, d = 0.23, 95% CI [0.04; 0.45], 
BF10 = 1.5, and no such effect in the valenced context pair condition, t(86) = -1.21, p = .23, d 
= -0.13, 95% CI [-0.34; 0.08], BF01 > 4.18. Perhaps more importantly, for the current paper, 
they showed an assimilative EC effect in the identical context pairings condition (i.e., they 
liked CS1 more than CS2), t(91) = 3.17, p = .002, d = 0.33, 95% CI [0.12; 0.54], BF10 = 
11.80, and a tendency for a contrast effect in the opposite context pairings condition (i.e., 
they tended to liked CS2 more than CS1). Note that this latter effect failed to significantly 
differ from zero, t(99) = 1.93, p = .06, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.06; 0.39], BF01 = 1.52, with IAT 
scores attenuated rather than completely reversed following opposite context pairs. 




Implicit-explicit correlations and contingency memory. Self-reported ratings of 
CS1 were negatively correlated with those of CS2 (r = -.49) and positively correlated with 
IAT scores (r = .44) (CS2 evaluations were negatively correlated with IAT scores; r = -.51). 
Explicit evaluations of CS1 (r = .35), CS2 (r = -.39) and IAT scores (r = .39) were all 
correlated with contingency memory performance (all ps < .001). 
Discussion 
We once again found that context pairings moderated EC effects. Similar to 
Experiment 1, assimilative EC effects emerged on explicit and implicit measures whenever 
people encountered context trials containing identical stimuli. Yet those same effects were 
once again attenuated when context trials contained stimuli that were opposite to one another. 
Interestingly these effects were evident when the context pairs were valenced in nature but 
largely absent when the context pairs were non-valenced. 
General Discussion 
We recently introduced a new symbolic perspective on EC that consists of three ideas: 
(a) pairings represent a contextual cue in the environment, (b) humans treat this cue as a 
symbol indicating that the CS and US are related in a certain way, and (c) it is this symbolic 
relationship between stimuli – established by pairings – which determines the subsequent 
change in liking. Whereas past work could be seen as relying on direct and explicit 
manipulations to alter the meaning of pairings, such as instructions (Moran & Bar-Anan, 
2015; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Zanon et al., 2014) and relational qualifiers (Förderer & 
Unkelbach, 2012), we adopted a different approach. One hypothesis to fall out of our 
symbolic perspective is that contextual pairings should moderate EC effects.  
Across two studies we asked participants to complete a learning phase comprised of 
two types of trials: context trials in which two (valenced or non-valenced) words were 
identical or opposite to one another, and EC trials, where a CS was paired with a US. In both 




cases we found that exposure to identical context pairs led to assimilative EC effects whereas 
opposition-based pairs led to reduced EC effects on explicit and implicit measures. These 
results are consistent with the prediction that EC is a function of the relational implications of 
stimulus pairs presented in the same context as CS-US pairs. 
Implications for a symbolic perspective on EC 
Strong vs. weak symbolic account. The fact that context pairs (just like instructions 
and relational qualifiers) can be used to moderate EC effects raises an interesting question: 
does the fact that pairings can serve as a relational contextual cue mean that EC effects are 
(by default) driven by pairings acting in such a manner? At this early stage one could respond 
to this question by referring to the two different versions of our symbolic account that we 
discussed in the introduction – a weak and a strong version. The weak symbolic perspective 
states that - under certain conditions - pairings can either function as a symbol or as a mere 
proximal cause of the change in liking. The goal then of EC research (given that we and 
others have found that pairings can function as a relational cue) is to identify and explain 
how, when, and why pairings function as a mere proximal cause vs. symbolic cue for liking 
(see De Houwer & Hughes, 2016 for more as well as concrete recommendations on how to 
do so).  
In contrast, a strong symbolic perspective would argue that pairings always function 
as a symbol. Although it is relatively easier to test whether pairings are functioning as a 
symbol (i.e., to provide confirmatory evidence in support of a strong account), it seems 
relatively more difficult to show that pairings are not functioning as a symbol in a given 
context (i.e., to disprove the strong account) (for reasons why see De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016). As such, we foresee a difficult and lengthy debate about whether EC can be found in 
the total absence of symbolic meaning construction.  




Attenuation vs. reversal. As we outlined in the introduction, the addition of relational 
qualifiers or instructions implying an opposition relation between paired stimuli often leads to 
attenuated rather than reversed EC effects (e.g., Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2010; Hu et al., 2017; 
Moran, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2016; Peters & Gawronski, 2011). We observed a similar 
pattern when context-pairs were used. On first glance, an attenuation rather than reversal in 
liking may seem to support a dual-process perspective while refuting a symbolic one. From a 
dual-process perspective, pairings may lead to the formation of an association between the 
CS and US (resulting in an assimilative effect) while context pairs lead to a proposition about 
how those stimuli are related (resulting in a contrastive effect), with the former process still 
exerting an impact on evaluations despite the presence of the latter. Yet an attenuation effect 
could also be accommodated by the aforementioned symbolic accounts in two ways.  
The first is a within-subjects account. In this case attenuation could be due to the fact 
that a small amount of training with a limited number of context pairs does not completely 
override the impact of a long learning history in which pairings function as a relational cue 
for similarity rather than opposition. That is, it may take more than a short 3-5 minute 
intervention to fully transform the ‘default’ symbolic meaning of pairings, especially with a 
‘subtle’ manipulation as used here. This might also explain why others have failed to find a 
full reversal (when using relational qualifiers and/or instructions) given that these 
manipulations are also exceptionally brief in nature. In other words, just as it can take time 
and effort to change the original symbolic meaning of a stimulus when it is overlearned (e.g., 
it might take some time for an English speaker to automatically respond to ‘pain’ as meaning 
‘bread’ after arriving in France), so too might it take more than several minutes with a subtle 
manipulation to change the symbolic meaning of a regularity – especially if the original 
meaning of that regularity has also been overlearned in the past. Put simply, participants 
might certainly learn that pairings have a particular meaning in the experimental context 




(opposition) and yet still recall the distal symbolic meaning of pairings that applies in many 
other contexts (similarity) (i.e., pairings may have two meanings for the same individual that 
simultaneously have an impact on liking). If so, then repeated training of the novel meaning 
of pairings across both time and context may be required to fully reverse evaluations.  
The second explanation is a between-subjects account. This would argue that context 
pairings do fully override the default meaning of pairings for some participants but leave the 
original meaning intact for others. The result is that evaluative effects appear to absent at the 
overall group level. This account resonates with the current data: if we only probe for an 
impact of context-pairs at the overall (group) level (as was typically the case in previous 
work) then we do indeed observe an attenuation effect. Yet a closer inspection of the 
individual-level data reveals descriptively different patterns of evaluation across participants 
(see supplementary materials). Whereas participants in the same context pairings condition 
generally show effects in the expected direction, there is considerably more variation in the 
opposite context-pairs condition. Specifically, some participants show a zero score (on the 
self-reports), others produce positive values, and still others show negative values.  
One possibility is that there are distinct subgroups of participants within the 
opposition condition. Some might be genuinely ambivalent towards the CSs (either because 
no evaluation was formed in the first place or because the two symbolic meanings of pairings 
cancel each-other out). Others might be responding in-line with the original meaning of 
pairings and thus show an assimilative effect (either because they failed to learn the new 
meaning conveyed by the context-pairs or, despite understanding this new contextual 
meaning, automatically make similarity-based inferences about the CS valence). Still others 
respond in-line with the novel meaning of pairings and thus show a contrastive effect.  
The key point here is that simply reporting findings at the overall group level may 
serve to hide potential subgroups of participants who fully reverse, attenuate, or continue to 




show the original effect. Critically, this may also be the case in previous studies which report 
attenuation effects and is clearly worthy of additional attention. It also highlights the need for 
caution when making strong claims about mental mechanisms (i.e., between dual vs. single 
process models of evaluation) on the basis of such findings. Inferences made on the basis of 
group-level data may support certain theoretical claims (dual-process accounts) whereas 
those made based on individual-level data support others (single-process accounts).  
Alternative (non-symbolic) explanations. The attenuation effects observed in our 
studies could also be driven by two other factors. The context pairing task used in the current 
experiments attempted to change the meaning of pairings via stimulus pairings. Unlike 
instructions, such a pairing-based manipulation may reinforce the ‘default’ meaning of 
pairings (similarity) in the act of trying to alter that meaning (opposition). This is somewhat 
analogous to pressing the accelerator in a car while pulling the brake: participants are asked 
to think of pairings as a cue for opposition while the original meaning (similarity) is being 
repeatedly elicited each time that they encounter one stimulus being paired with another. We 
also tried to change the meaning of pairings during the EC phase itself. This requires 
participants to not only discover the new meaning of pairings but simultaneously use it to 
inform their stimulus evaluations. Although it worked, we may have had more success if our 
symbolic meaning manipulation was distinct from, and actually came before, the EC phase 
(e.g., similar to the priming task used by Corneille et al., 2009, or a pre-training phase that 
involves exclusively opposite pairs presented across several experimental sessions and only 
then the EC phase). Previous work indicates that timing matters when it comes to changing 
the meaning of pairings: providing explicit information about the meaning or validity of 
paired events before people encounter those pairings influences explicit and implicit 
evaluations whereas doing so after the pairings influences explicit but not implicit 




evaluations (e.g., Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Zanon et al., 
2014; although see Moran, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2017). 
Broader implications. Conceptualizing pairings as a symbolic cue also has 
implications for other research areas, including classical conditioning and persuasion. With 
respect to conditioning, our findings support the idea that human behavior is often based on 
the meaning attributed to, rather than the mere physical properties of, the environment. In 
other words, our symbolic account is constructivist in nature and highlights that a specific 
type of meaning construction (symbolic) may take place via a specific type of proximal event 
(pairings). This may also be the case in other, non-evaluative domains, such as causal (e.g., 
Waldmann, 2017) and fear learning (Craske, Hermans, & Vansteenwegen, 2006). Likewise, 
the suggestion that only humans can use symbols (e.g., Deacon, 1997; Hayes et al., 2001) 
opens up yet another interesting possibility: it may be that the types of symbolic effects 
reported here are restricted to humans who have developed the ability to use symbols and are 
absent in humans and non-humans who have not.  
The symbolic account also suggests that EC and persuasion may have more in 
common than previously thought. For instance, theories of persuasion such as the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and Elaboration-Likelihood Model 
(e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) view the mental processes that mediate changes in liking due 
to pairings (EC) as primitive in nature. The former (HSM) would consider pairings as a 
heuristic cue (i.e., an environmental cue which elicits an information processing strategy 
based on simple rules, schemas, or prior knowledge) (e.g., pairings automatically elicit a rule 
such as “stimuli which co-occur are similar in valence”). The latter (ELM) typically relegates 
pairings to the peripheral route of attitude change, and sees it as a potential input for, but 
rarely a type of, argument in itself (Petty & Brinol, 2014). Other theories, like the Unimodel 
of persuasion, do allow for “persuasive evidence to be presented in an unlimited number of 




forms and variations”, (Bohner, Erb, & Siebler, 2008; p.172) including forms that do not 
involve words or sentences, such as pairings (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). In short, 
certain theories of persuasion tend to view pairings as a simple heuristic cue whereas others 
allow for the possibility that pairings could function as a persuasive argument.  
Yet many types of EC effects – including those reported here - involve more than the 
mere pairing of stimuli. Participants are often given extra verbal information about the 
pairings (e.g., relational qualifiers, instructions, cover stories) and/or provided with the 
motivation and opportunity to think about the pairings in some way (e.g., make online 
judgements). This combination of verbal information and pairings (and/or requirement to 
effortfully think about them) may lead people to treat pairings, not as a heuristic cue, but as a 
‘regularity-based argument’ (e.g., “the CS causes Cancer” is an argument for disliking the 
CS). The same may be true when (a) contextual pairings are provided along with CS-US 
pairings, (b) participants are given the conditions necessary to elaborate on both pieces of 
information, and (c) we raise their motivation to process that information via pre-task 
instructions (as in the current experiments). If so, then EC and persuasion may both involve 
changes in liking due to arguments but differ in the way that those arguments are delivered 
and constructed (e.g., either via stimulus pairings [EC] or words and sentences [persuasion]). 
Indeed, it may be that pairings - even in the absence of extra verbal instructions or 
information – can also serve as an argument indicating that a CS is similar to a US, and as a 
result, leads to a change in liking. This is not to say that pairings will always function in this 
regard: when motivation and ability to process pairings are low, it is likely that the mere fact 
that stimuli are paired does indeed function as a heuristic cue. However, increasing people’s 
motivation and opportunities to effortfully operate on the pairings, may cause them to treat 
pairings as a simple, regularity-based, argument and this argument may drive their 
evaluations (i.e., pairings may function as both heuristic cue and persuasive argument). 




Regardless, the take home message here is that EC is closely related to persuasion and 
compatible with several theories in the area. As far as we know, EC and persuasion have 
never been linked in this way, perhaps because the former is typically considered as a 
primitive, non-symbolic phenomenon (for more see De Houwer & Hughes, 2016; Hughes, 
Ye, Van Dessel, & De Houwer, in press).  
Future directions. Our findings open up a number of avenues for future research on 
EC. First, and as we previously mentioned, researchers often view contextual information 
such as instructions, qualifiers, and judgments as symbolic messages that are applied on top 
of pairings. Yet our symbolic account takes a different stance - such information alters the 
meaning of the pairings themselves. This perspective makes several new predictions about 
EC effects. Foremost amongst these is that the symbolic meaning of pairings is not confined 
to same and opposite. People can – in principle – respond to pairings as a cue indicating that 
a CS caused or prevented, comes before or after, or is stronger or weaker than a US. Future 
research could modify our procedure to test this idea. For instance, we could present context 
pairings in which the first stimulus is a known cause of the second element (e.g., weapon – 
injury) or a known preventer of the second element (e.g., medicine – disease).    
Second, although most participants reported that they were aware of the presence and 
content of the context pairs (i.e., that they involved identical or opposite stimuli), many failed 
to take those pairings into account when generating stimulus evaluations. Future work will 
need to consider whether and why certain types of context pairs, or ways of manipulating the 
meaning of pairings, are more effective at transferring relational properties than others. For 
instance, we found that non-valanced context pairs moderated EC effects in Experiment 1 and 
yet valenced (but not non-valenced) pairs did so in Experiment 2 (although note that the 
context and CS-US pairs were blocked in the former and interspersed with one another in the 
latter experiments). We also observed more zero scores in Experiment 2 relative to 




Experiment 1. Clearly there are boundary conditions to the effectiveness of such 
manipulations. Future work could also directly assess what meaning the CS-US pairings have 
for participants rather than solely infer it from changes in evaluation. Doing so could serve as 
an additional manipulation check and could be correlated with specific changes in EC effects 
(e.g., perhaps only those who can report that the meaning of pairings has changed will show 
full reversals in liking). Third, future work could incorporate a control condition where no 
context pairings are encountered in order to determine if similarity-based context pairs 
increase EC effects or if opposition-based pairs significantly weaken EC effects compared to 
normal. Fourth, the presence or absence of context pairs at the time of encoding, storage, or 
retrieval may determine how much of an impact they have on the proximal meaning of CS-
US pairings. Future work could test whether a similar pattern of results emerges when 
context pairings are provided either before or after an EC phase. 
Finally, it is worth considering alternative explanations for our findings. For instance, 
it may be that the observed assimilative and attenuated effects were not due to the symbolic 
meaning of pairings established by the context trials but rather due to pairings taking place 
between (rather than within) trials. To illustrate, imagine that participants first encounter one 
stimulus pair (Love-Hate) followed by a second (Love-CS1). It may be that people ignored 
the contiguity between Love and CS1 and instead decided to relate CS1 directly with Hate. 
This alternative account does not require that people consider the symbolic implications of 
pairings (e.g., that paired stimuli are opposite; therefore CS1 is opposite to love). Instead, 
they simply need to recognize the relation between the elements of different pairs (e.g., CS1 
has the same meaning as hate because they both co-occur with love) rather than the relation 
between the elements within a pair (Love-Hate; CS1-Love). Although a possible explanation 
for Experiment 2, it is difficult to see how it could adequately account for Experiment 1, 
where context pairs were non-valenced and blocked rather than interspersed with CS-US 




trials. A second possibility is that pairing a positive with a negative US (e.g., Love-Hate) led 
to US-revaluation, where the respective USs decreased in their valence. When subsequently 
paired with the CS this would explain why there was an attenuated rather than reversed EC 
effect. Yet, once again, this hypothesis can only account for the findings obtained from our 
second and not first study. Future work could test both accounts by having participants (a) 
rate the valence of the USs before and after the learning phase and seeing if there is a change, 
or (b) ensure that there was no stimulus overlap between context and EC trials. 
Conclusion 
Our results lend further support to the idea that EC effects can be moderated by 
contextual (relational) information that is relevant to the paired events. Whereas past work 
relied on direct manipulations that added a separate message on top of pairings, we show that 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for hypothesis awareness and influence, context pair awareness and influence, and 
contiguity memory in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 Yes No Yes No 
Hypothesis Awareness  2 (2.2%) 90 (97.8%)  10 (5%) 183 (94%) 
Hypothesis Influence 8 (8.7%)  84 (91.3%)  6 (3%) 187 (96%) 
Context Pair Awareness  82 (89.1%) 6 (6.5%)  193 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Context Pair Influence  40 (43.5%) 49 (53.3%)  65 (33%) 128 (66%) 
Contingency Memory   67 (72.8%)  22 (23.9%)  123 (64%) 70 (36%) 
Note. Participants were defined as hypothesis aware if they indicated that we used the context pairings to 
influence how they responded and as unaware if they did not. They were defined as hypothesis influenced 
if they said that the context pairings influenced their CS evaluations. Participants were defined as context 
pair aware if they noticed the relational nature of the context pairs during the learning phase (e.g., that we 
presented words that were similar or opposite to one another) and influence aware if they thought the pairs 
influenced how they evaluated the CSs. Participants correctly remembered the contingency between CSs 




Table 2. Means and standard deviations of self-reported ratings and IAT scores as a function of context pair type 
and valence in Experiment 1. 
 
Pair Type Same 
(N = 44) 
Opposite 
(N = 48) 
Overall 
(N = 92) 
Ratings    
CS1 3.29 (1.97)  -0.06 (3.85)  1.54 (3.51)  
CS2 -3.53 (1.99)  -0.25 (3.83)   -1.82 (3.49) 
















Table 3. Means and standard deviations of self-reported ratings and IAT scores as a function of context pair type 
and valence in Experiment 2. 
 
 Valenced Pairs Non-Valenced Pairs 
Pair Type Same 
(N = 42) 
Opposite 
(N = 45) 
Overall 
(N = 87) 
Same 
(N = 50) 
Opposite 
(N = 56) 
Overall 
(N = 106) 
Ratings       
CS1 2.19 (2.19) 0.22 (3.04) 1.17 (2.83) 1.09 (1.72) 1.14 (2.52) 1.12 (2.17) 
CS2 -1.43 (2.27) 1.21 (2.74) -0.07 (2.84) -0.55 (2.17) -0.10 (2.71) -0.31 (2.47) 
IAT D4 scores        























Table 1. Number of participants who showed positive, negative, or neutral evaluative effects in Experiments 1-2 
towards CS1 (paired with positive USs), CS2 (paired with negative USs), or on the IAT, as a function of 
context-pairing type (same or opposite). 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 Same Opposite Same Opposite 
Self-Reported Ratings (CS1)     
Positive effect 39 (88%) 24 (50%) 59 (64%) 49 (49%) 
Neutral effect 3 (7%) 3 (6%) 21 (23%) 24 (24%) 
Negative effect 2 (5%) 21 (44%) 12 (13%) 28 (28%) 
Self-Reported Ratings (CS2)     
Positive effect 1 (2%) 22 (46%) 21 (23%) 45 (45%) 
Neutral effect 3 (7%) 3 (6%) 25 (27%) 27 (27%) 
Negative effect 40 (91%) 23 (48%) 46 (50%) 29 (29%) 
IAT effect     
Positive effect 36 (82%) 24 (50%) 60 (65%) 46 (46%) 
Neutral effect 1 (2%) 3 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 














































Figure 1. Frequency distribution of individual-level effects for the self-reported ratings of CS1 and CS2 (as well 






































Figure 2. Frequency distribution of individual-level effects for the self-reported ratings of CS1 and CS2 (as well 

















































Figure 3. Frequency distribution of individual-level effects for the self-reported ratings of CS1 and CS2 (as well 









































Figure 4. Frequency distribution of individual-level effects for the self-reported ratings of CS1 and CS2 (as well 
as IAT scores) for those in the valenced and non-valenced opposite context pairs conditions in Experiment 2.  
 
